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      A b s t r a c t  
 
  The Red de Protección Social (RPS) in Nicaragua is one of a growing number of conditional cash transfer 
programs that pay households cash stipends in exchange for school attendance and regular visits to health clinics. A 
key feature of these programs is that the cash is given to the woman head of household. The rationale stems from 
previous research in the developing world that transfers to women are more likely to be spent on health, nutrition, 
and education of children and thus to reinforce the goals of these programs. One concern is that less powerful 
women may not be as impacted by program funds, because males in those household will decrease their 
contributions in response to the transfers. Utilizing randomized experimental data from RPS, we test for 
heterogeneous program impacts on school enrollment and spending based on a woman’s power as proxied by her 
education relative to her husband . Our results confirm previous findings that generally more household resources 
are devoted toward children when women are more powerful; however, when women’s power greatly exceeds her 
husband’s additional female power lowers school enrollment., Additionally we find that RPS’ impacts on schooling 
are substantially larger than expected income effects estimated from the control group, although we do not find 
evidence that female power alters RPS impacts on school enrollment.  In terms of spending effects, RPS increased 
food and education expenditures in all households, yet this impact is attributable mostly to income effects. Finally, 
we find RPS had non-income impacts on milk expenditures particularly for less powerful women.. 
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Many poverty alleviation programs in developing countries stipulate that payments or 
benefits be given to a woman head of household (Rawlings and Rubio, 2005) The justification 
for targeting women is based on theoretical models and empirical findings which show that 
payments received by women are more likely to be spent on improving the welfare of children 
(for theoretical work see Kanbur and Haddad, 1994; Haddad et al. 1997; Basu, 2006 and for 
empirical see: Schultz, 1990; Thomas, 1990; and Doss, 1996). This paper explores the impact of 
this requirement in a program in Nicaragua, the Red de Protección Social (RPS), which is a 
conditional cash transfer (CCT) program that gives women a cash payment if they meet 
requirements that include child school attendance and regular visits to health care clinics.  
Empirical evidence for the effectiveness of targeting CCTs to women is limited in terms 
of school enrollment and other consumption outcomes. Three critical components of CCTs 
confound efforts to cleanly identify impacts on school enrollment.  First is the basic difference 
between income and non-income effects.  Would a cash-transfer without conditions achieve a 
similar school enrollment outcome because education is a normal or even superior good in the 
demand profile of low-income families?  Then, non-income effects of targeted CCTs include 
both the conditionality requirements of program participation (essentially a price effect) and the 
intrahousehold effects of providing women with the transfer.  In other words, education 
outcomes are also shaped by two distinct effects that are both part of the program’s treatment. 
Alternatively, an ideal randomized experiment aimed at identifying intrahousehold impacts of 
cash transfers targeted to women would include randomly targeting some transfers to men and 






household spending patterns of the treatment group (that are not conditional) to see whether 
intrahousehold effects matter and in what ways.   One can also look at the effects of 
intrahousehold differences in the control group (or the baseline data of the treatment group) to 
see whether pre-existing differences in education and spending patterns are consistent with 
gender power differences. 
The goal of this article is to explore how RPS shapes education and spending patterns 
with an eye toward all three effects: income, conditionality, and intrahousehold impacts.  On the 
intrahousehold side, the intention is both to identify whether pre-existing gender power 
structures are at work and whether they are mitigated by the program (either through 
conditionality in the case of schooling) and/or by targeting transfers to women.  Although 
transfers are targeted directly to women, it is important to note that household resources are 
potentially fungible.  This feature raises a common concern that other family resources may be 
reallocated away from children, effectively offsetting the impact of the transfer.  Empirically, 
this concern could be captured by demonstrating smaller effects of CCTs on key outcomes in 
households where men have more power.  Clearly, by targeting transfers to women, RPS has the 
implicit goal of helping to insure that money is spent on women and children who might 
otherwise receive smaller shares of household resources in male dominated households.  Thus, it 
is also possible that the impacts of CCT programs could be higher in male dominated households 
if they have the effect of changing behavior in the family that previously cut against salutary 
outcomes for women and children.  
The empirical analysis utilizes experimental methods that compare treatment and control 






estimating heterogeneous program impacts according to intrahousehold power differences.  The 
power measure used in this paper - as in Ravallion et al. (2003)and Felkey (2006) - is based on 
the ratio of years of school completed by the female and male heads of household. We assume 
that the female’s intrahousehold increases as the female to male education ratio rises.  The 
measure is arguably better in terms of exogeneity than male and female wage earnings 
sometimes used in other studies, because earnings are endogenous to intrahousehold decision-
making and correlated with child wages, both of which could impact schooling decisions.  
The remainder article is organized as follows. The first section places this work within 
the context of the current literature and identifies the conceptual contributions of this article. 
Section II presents the empirical approach to analyzing the impact of power and RPS on 
schooling and household spending. Section III provides background information on RPS along 
with descriptive statistics on variables of interest. Results of the estimations are reported in 
Section IV, with conclusions and suggestions for further study offered in Section V. 
I: Literature Review 
This paper links three related lines of literature. The first is an intra-household bargaining 
literature, which suggests heterogeneous preference between men and women can lead to 
different household decisions depending on power relationships. The second attempts to measure 
the impacts of conditional cash transfer programs, with a particular focus on which aspects of the 
program (conditions or cash) are more effective in obtaining the desired results. Finally, the third 
line seeks to find whether there are demonstrable effects of targeting CCTs to women.  
The theoretical and empirical literature on how households make decisions is well 






deployed to study decisions on child schooling versus labor and the allocation of consumption 
expenditures between private and shared goods.  Unitary models are canonical (Becker, 1981); 
they assume either a benevolent dictator, or that household members share the same preferences 
and pool their resources to maximize a single household utility function. In these models, 
targeting transfers to women should have no impact on a household’s allocation of spending 
other than through household income effects (Attanasio and Lechene, 2002).  
Non-unitary models generally examine decisions made by a man and a woman who have 
distinct preferences and make decisions somewhere along a spectrum of full cooperation or some 
mix of cooperation and conflict (Chiappori, 1992; McElroy and Horney, 1981, Basu 2006).  
Differences in bargaining power influence whose preferences gain greater expression in the 
household’s choices.  Typically, these models assume that women have stronger preferences for 
child schooling and health outcomes and thus predict distinct effects of increases in non-wage 
income, such as a conditional cash transfer program, based on who receives the transfer. In effect, 
conditional cash transfer programs have motivated their decision to target transfers to women on 
these non-unitary models, with the assumption that women’s higher propensity to spend on 
household shared goods will augment program effects.   
Empirically, power relationships between fathers and mothers have been shown to affect 
child schooling outcomes (Binder, 1999; Adato et al., 2003; Iyigun and Walsh, Forthcoming), 
with relative income increases for women raising child school attendance. For example, Thomas 
(1990) and Schultz (1990) both show that non-wage income received by mothers was more 
likely than income received by fathers to be spent on children’s health or schooling. More recent 






pensions in South Africa were more likely to increase health outcomes of granddaughters of 
grandmothers than any other grandparent-grandchild relationship.  Her finding suggests the 
added nuance that impacts of transfer payments may also vary depending on the child’s gender. 
Similarly in Brazil, Emerson and Souza (2007) find that father’s education has a greater impact 
on sons than mother’s education and the reverse is true for daughters.   
Two studies have examined explicitly the impacts of conditional cash transfers using an 
intra-household framework, Adato et al. (2003) and Attanasio and Lechene (2002). Both 
consider Progresa (now known as Oportunidades), a Mexican conditional cash transfer program. 
Using a qualitative approach, Adato et al. (2003) finds that Progresa decreased the likelihood that 
the husband would report himself as the sole decision maker in terms of spending on child health 
care, school attendance, and clothing, suggesting that women’s bargaining power is improved by 
the targeted cash transfer.  In a more quantitative approach, Attanasio and Lechene (2002) test 
the impact of Progresa and women’s bargaining power as measured by the relative wages 
(potential and actual) of men and women on the share of household expenditures devoted to 
different goods (food, alcohol, transportation, services, and clothing).
1 The role of women’s 
power is supported by results that show an increase in the relative income of women, including 
the increase from Progresa’s targeted cash transfer, has a positive relationship on the share of 
expenditures on children’s clothing and food.  
One critical methodological and empirical issue in the intrahousehold literature is how to 
measure bargaining power. Adato et al. (2003) suggest that each member’s bargaining power 
will be based on four factors: who controls which resources, influences used to alter the 






that those with greater own assets or income (actual or potential) can exert more power, because 
they can withdraw from the household more easily (Doss, 1996).  In that sense, conditional cash 
transfers could increase the utility of the women’s exit option and her bargaining power, as long 
as women would still receive the transfer even if they left the household. 
  This article utilizes a ratio of the number of years of school completed by the female to 
the male head of household as a measure of power.  We assume that as the female to male 
education increases, the femaile is likely to have more decision-making power. In addition, 
education is likely to be positively correlated with both current income potential and assets 
before marriage as people from wealthier families are more likely to attend school. More 
education may also provide power as Ravallion et al. (2003) find when one household member is 
literate and others are not, that the literate member can withhold information from the illiterate 
members to gain an advantage. The power measure also has the advantage of being exogenous to 
current income levels because as Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) suggest the relative wage/income 
measure is endogenous to other household decisions. In the RPS sample data, the relative wage 
measure would not be effective in any event, because women’s labor force participation rates are 
around 10% for both literate and illiterate women, which would render potential or actual income 
largely unobserved.
2  
  A great majority of the intrahousehold literature suggests that female power is both 
positively and monotonically related to spending on children and school enrollment. However, 
this assumption has been question by a few recent works (Basu, 2006; Lancaster et al. 2006; 
Felkey, 2006). Basu (2006) in an intra-household theoretical framework demonstrates that if 






produced by child labor. Based on this result he posits that as her power continues to increase she 
will receive more benefits to child labor, while the benefits of schooling may stay the same.  He 
therefore concludes if women become sufficiently more powerful than men, then additional 
female power may actually decrease school enrollment. Lancaster et al. (2006) and Felkey (2006) 
provide empirical evidence in support of Basu’s hypothesis using samples from India and 
Bulgaria, respectively. In Nicaragua even when women have equal education to their husbands 
they still may not have equal power due to culture norms. However, at a certain point, women 
with more education then their husbands could have sufficient power to sustain the non-
monotonic result suggest by Basu. We provide a test of Basu’s hypothesis by examining non-
linear effects of the female to male education ratio. Additionally, our paper adds to these 
previous works by testing whether a cash payment made to the mother is likely to increase her 
power. 
Previous works have shown that RPS and the comparison Mexican program, Progresa, 
have been effective at increasing school enrollment rates and encouraging spending on food (for 
RPS see Maluccio and Flores, 2005; for Progresa see Schultz, 2004; Hoddinott and Skoufias, 
2004).  The regression specification utilized by Hoddinott and Skoufias (2004) includes total 
consumption (including the transfer) as well as program participation indicator variables. This 
combination helps to provide estimates, respectively, for income and non-income impacts of 
Progresa on food spending.  They find, for example, that for total food expenditures non-income 
effects account for around half of the total impact of Progresa and a higher percentage for 
expenditures on fruit/vegetable and animal products. They place much of the credit for these 






expenditures on fruit, vegetables and milk.  Attanasio and Lechene (2002) contend that the 
impacts may also be tied to targeting the payment to women, and clearly both could be correct.  
The health education lectures provided by Progresa could shape preferences, and targeted 
transfers could enhance women’s bargaining power and thus their capacity to reveal those 
preferences.  What is not clear is whether those expenditures might also have been viewed 
implicitly by the recipients as part of the conditionality of Progresa.  In a simulation of Bolsa 
Escolar, a Brazilian CCT, Bourguignon et al. (2003) find that both the conditionality of school 
attendance and income effects increase school enrollment. 
Finally, a third line of literature suggests that pre-existing household conditions can shape 
the impact of a transfer. De Janvry and Sadoulet (2006) argue that CCTs like RPS and Progresa 
may improve upon their results by moving from a uniform transfer size to one tied to easily 
observable household characteristics that alter program impacts. We utilize parental education as 
an easily observable characteristic that may create heterogeneous impacts based on differences in 
preferences and power among men and women. Although Attanasio and Lechene (2002) find 
payments made to women increase expenditures on food and schooling by increasing women’s 
power (as measured by the ratio of female/male income), they do not test for non-linearities in 
this relationship. One possibility is that transfers to less powerful women may increase their 
power enough to participate in decision making, and thus augment the targeting effect (as 
suggested by Adato et al. (2004). Another possibility is that less powerful women might not be 
able to keep the whole transfer or males might withdraw funds from the households.  
It should also be noted that De Janvry and Soudelet (2006) include parental literacy in 






of the mother and father’s literacy are estimated as separate effects and not relative to one 
another as a measure of power. They find that both father and mother’s literacy increases 
schooling and decreases the size of the transfer required for the child to attend school. However, 
their regression does not include controls for income, so parental schooling may also be 
capturing an income effect.  Most importantly, they do not compare, as we do below, across 
households with distinct female to male education ratios to explore the potential of this measure 
as a proxy for bargaining power.   
II. An Empirical Strategy for Estimating Impacts of Power and RPS 
  We explore three components of household schooling and resource allocation decisions. 
First, we test if education outcomes and household spending patterns are impacted by power 
structures ex-ante of program effects. The goal of this test is to see if our power measure 
provides consistent results with the previously cited literature that more powerful women’s 
children are more likely to attend school and receive a larger share of resources.   
The second component is to devise an estimate that identifies income and non-income 
effects. To do so, we utilize the control group to estimate income impacts on schooling and 
household spending. The income effects of a cash transfer the size of RPS in the control group 
are then compared to total effects of RPS, with the difference of these two being an estimate of 
non-income effects.  The third component is to examine whether women’s power may affect 
program impacts in terms of school attendance and household spending.  This is done by 
interacting variables which measure program impact and the power measure to test for 






  The conventional approach to analyzing treatment effects of conditional cash transfer 
programs such as RPS is to use cross-sectional or panel data to compare outcomes in treatment 
and control groups. When the dependent variable of interest (e.g. school enrollment or 
consumption share) is not substantially different in the baseline year in control and treatment 
communities, then program impacts can be measured using cross-sectional data in the treatment 
year. However, if initial conditions (in either dependent or independent variables) are different in 
treatment and control communities, then the full panel data should be utilized. Difference-in-
difference (DID) is the standard method used to measure impacts when initial conditions are not 
the same in control and treatment communities. The DID method measures the difference in the 
changes of the outcome of interest in treatment and control communities between the first year of 
treatment, year 1, and the baseline, year 0. For example, if the outcome of interest in time period, 
t, is denoted as Ct for control communities and It, for those in the treatment (intervention group) 
then the difference-in-difference program impact, denoted δ1, is determined using the following 
result, δ1 = (I1 – I0) – (C1 – C0).  If through randomization in the baseline, the outcome of interest 
is equally likely in both groups, then the DID is equivalent to (I1 -C1).    
Maluccio and Flores (2004) in their analysis of RPS present a basic estimation equation 
for DID, which is presented in equation 1 below. Program impacts are measured using the DID 
variables, δ1 the coefficient on the term Treat which is the interaction of two binary dummy 










ict   ic 0 2 2 1 1 0  v u   + + + + + + = Treat RPS A A E t ict δ δ α α α   (1) 
Where: 
Eict = outcome variable of interest for household (or individual) i in community c at time t 
A1 = (1) if Year 2001 
A2 = (1) if Year 2002 
Treat = (1) if Treatment Year (2001 or 2002) & if household is in RPS intervention in 
community c 
μic = all (observed and unobserved) household- (or individual-) level time-invariant factors 
νict = unobserved idiosyncratic household (or individual) and time-varying error 
and all of the α’s and δ’s are unknown parameters. 
  In order to measure power we create a ratio we will henceforth refer to as relative Female 
Power by Schooling Years (rFPSY). The ratio is the number of years of school completed by the 
female head of household divided by the number of years of school completed by the male head 
of household. Since 49% of males have zero years of school completed, we add one to both 
number of school years to create a defined ratio for all households. Therefore rFPSY can be 







Head Male Completed School Years of
Head Female Completed School Years of
rFPSY   
  The variable rFPSY is used to measure the impact of female power on school enrollment 
and household expenditures. In addition we include the square of rFPSY in order to test for the 
possible non-linearity of the relationship between power and these outcomes. Next to estimate 






with the treatment impact measure Treat. Additionally we interact the square of the power 
measure and treatment impact measure to test for a non-linear relationship between power and 
RPS impacts. Finally, in order to estimate and control for income effects including those from 
RPS transfers, we include total per capita consumption (PCC). When PCC is included the 
estimated impacts of non-income effects T*RPS in Equation 2 for all households is represented 
by δ1. The estimated impacts of power on RPS effects are represented by δ2 and δ3, respectively. 
   v u ln ln 2 ^ * *
* * * 2 ^  
ict   ic 2 1 3
2 1 0 4 3 2 2 1 1 0
+ + + + +
+ + + + + + + =
ct ct
ict
Size n Consumptio rFPSY RPS T
rFPSY RPS T RPS T RPS rFPSY rFPSY A A E
β β δ
δ δ δ α α α α α
(2) 
Eict = In community c at time t is:  
If child “i” enrolled in school (1) else zero or  
household expenditures on item (E) by household i , 
Fi = (1) if Female adult is literate 
Mi = (1) if Male adult is literate 
MFi= (1) if Male and Female adults are literate 
lnConsumption = ln(total consumption) for household c in year t (baseline) 
RPSc = (1) if RPS intervention in community c 
lnSizet = ln (household size) in year t. 
For the first two components, the above regression specification is similar with some 
important distinctions to Hoddinott and Skoufias (2004) who estimate Progresa’s impact on food 
consumption. Their specification includes household characteristics including the education of 
the head, while our specification includes the education of both the head and their spouse.  To 






Skoufias (2004), including total consumption in the regression as a control for income (including 
the transfer) as well as program effect measures.  As they note, if a conditional cash transfer 
alters consumption other than directly through transfers, then total consumption becomes 
endogenous and may bias the results. However, this does not appear to be the case, as Maluccio 
and Flores (2005) find that the ex post  increases in consumption for the treatment group are not 
statistically significantly different from the transfer.  
The final component of the specification is to measure heterogeneous impacts of RPS 
based on household characteristics. Our approach is similar to two previous studies which 
measure the effect of economic shocks (Maluccio, 2005 and De Janvry et al. 2006) on the 
impacts of RPS and Progresa, respectively. In these studies the heterogeneity among households 
is determined by exposure to these shocks. A measurement for exposure to shocks is then 
interacted with the program eligibility variable. Our approach is similar with the only difference 
being that our heterogeneity comes from the power measure rather than exposure to shock. 
  All of the models (school enrollment and expenditure levels and shares) are estimated 
using OLS. Due to the interaction terms, estimating marginal effects becomes quite difficult 
using qualitative variable methods. In Gitter and Barham (2006), we find that OLS estimations of 
the enrollment impacts of RPS are similar to probit predictions.  In all of the estimations, errors 
are clustered at the community level to control for unobserved heterogeneity between 
communities. Finally, since the household decision on school attendance may be different for 








  III. Summary of the RPS Program and Descriptive Statistics 
  The Red de Protección Social (RPS) was implemented in 21 randomly selected 
communities in Northwestern Nicaragua (Madríz and Matagalpa).  An additional 21 
communities in the region provide a control group. Three survey rounds were taken in all 42 
communities, one in the year 2000 before program implementation and two surveys during the 
program one each in the years 2001 and 2002. This analysis uses a sub-sample of the 1300 total 
households where there is head of household who is married or has a spouse, which accounts for 
1129 households.
4 
Participation in treatment communities was extremely high as uptake rates were over 
95% of those eligible participated.
5 Benefits include a C$2,880 ($224) annual food security 
transfer.
6  Households with children ages 7-13 who have not completed the fourth grade were 
eligible for a bi-monthly transfer for school attendance of C$1440 per year and an additional 
C$275 for school supplies.  The average household received C$3885 ($302), or about 18% of 
total annual household consumption expenditures.  
  Baseline comparisons between treatment and control groups on outcomes and 
explanatory variables support the use of experimental methods to test for impact results. For 
example, the average school enrollment for children of eligible age (7-13) in the baseline sample 
was 77%, with about a 0.1% difference between treatment and control groups. The difference in 
aggregate total consumption and other consumption measures in treatment and control groups are 
not significantly different from zero.  
The impact of relative education of the male and female household head is shown in 







7  The parental literacy measure suggests that relative female power based on 
education is a useful measure as it is generally exogenous to consumption and treatment. 
Furthermore, the variable is consistent with the previously cited literate that suggests children of 
more powerful women receive a larger share of household recourses.  Of all the households  in 
23% both adults are literate, 47% both are illiterate, 14% women only literate, and in 16% male 
only literate. Similar to other key measures there are no statistically significantly differences in 
percentage of households in any one power group between treatment and control communities.   
One possible concern with the literacy measure is that it is tied to income, thereby 
creating endogeneity problems.  A comparison in Table 1 of total consumption and the literacy 
measure shows the two measures are not strongly linked, as would be expected. In particular, the 
difference in total consumption between the two groups that are likely to have divergent power 
(male only and female only) is not statistically significant. There is less than a 10% difference in 
total consumption for households with one member literate and those with neither adult head 
being literate; however, that difference is not statistically different from 0 at the 5% level. 
Households where both members are literate have average consumption over 20% greater than 
those where one household head is literate and close to 30% greater than where neither male nor 
female head is literate.  
Previously cited literature suggests that female power is linked to higher school 
attendance and spending on children. The relative literacy measure in Table 1 shows the 
predicted relationship in terms of school enrollment as households with a literate female (both or 
female only) had child school enrollment rates between 82% - 87% in the baseline year, 






difference in school enrollment rates for children in the baseline between female only and male 
only literate households is ten percentage points.  
The relationship between power and spending can be seen in some of the explanatory 
variables (See Table 2). The previously cited literature suggests that households where females 
have more power will spend more on food and education of their children.  However, in the RPS 
sample there is weak evidence in terms of total food spending, though it is worth highlighting 
that food expenditures account for such a high proportion of total consumption (70%) that the 
deep poverty of these Nicaraguan families might blunt differences in food expenditures evident 
in other places. Unfortunately, we do not have data on individual food consumption as children 
in households with a powerful female might receive a greater proportion of food.  We, therefore, 
also look specifically at milk consumption (including infant formula), which is more likely to 
benefit children. Milk consumption does shows signs of being related to women’s power; in the 
baseline data female-only literate households consume more milk than do male-only literate 
households.   
  In their analysis of the total impact of RPS, Maluccio and Flores (2004) use difference-
in-difference estimates to measure program outcomes. Tables 1 and 2 provide basic difference-
in-difference estimations for each of the four literacy groups for the outcomes of school 
enrollment, expenditures, and expenditure shares respectively.  In terms of school enrollment, the 
impacts are larger in households where the female is not literate.  This could be due to either 
intrahousehold effects or conditionality requirements.  Because enrollment was at or above 95% 
in all of the power groups in treatment communities, we suspect that conditionality plays the 






2002 results in greater estimated RPS impacts occurring in households without a literate female 
adult.   
  One common concern is that men might withdraw money from the household as women 
receive income from the transfer. If this concern was evident in the data, we would expect male 
only literate households to have smaller expenditure impacts from RPS. However, in all cases, 
impacts from RPS treatment as measured by difference-in-difference estimates shows larger 
impacts for male only literate households than in females only literate households (except food 
expenditures 2002).   This outcome suggests that RPS transfers to women are having the 
intended impact of strengthening their potential to influence household consumption and 
investment choices rather than being captured by men who had pre-transfer power advantages. 
                                             IV. Econometric Results 
  This section presents the results of estimations of influences on child schooling and 
household spending. There are three major components of these influences: the effect of female 
power ex-ante of program impacts, income versus non-income impacts of the program, and 
variation in program impacts by female power.  Two sets of regression results are reported: 
impacts on school enrollment in Table 3, impacts on per capita expenditures for food, education 
and milk in Table 4. The regression specification is supported by the finding of ex-ante impact of 
female power for child school enrollment and household spending on education. Our results also 
show both income and non-income effects from RPS, with non-income effects being more 
important for schooling and income effects being more important for household spending.  
We begin with the econometric analysis of school enrollment outcomes for children ages 






children and one each for boys and girls. The impact ex-ante of gender power differences can be 
seen through the two rFPSY measures, which increase as females have a higher ratio of 
education to their male partners. These results are also consistent with the non-monotonic 
relationship between power and schooling suggested by Basu (2006). The coefficients on both 
rFPSY (positive) and rFPSY^2 (negative) are statistically significant for the sample of all 
children and girls. Generally, children’s schooling is positively associated with maternal power, 
except when the rFPSY ratio is larger than 5 (this constitutes about 3% of the children), at which 
point further maternal schooling begins to decrease enrollment. For boys, the quadratic term is 
not statistically significant, and the results suggest a positively monotonic relationship between 
female power (rFPSY) and school enrollment. 
The second component of interest - the comparison of income and non-income effects – 
is captured by the RPS impact measures (Treat), because we control for income effects by using 
total household consumption (including RPS transfers).  The RPS non-income impacts on school 
enrollment for both years were measured at 15.5% for the total sample with the impact on girls 
slightly higher, but not statistically significantly so. This estimate compares to estimated total 
impacts (income and non-income) of 22% and 18%, for 2001 and 2002 respectively by Maluccio 
and Flores (2004). This difference between our non-income estimates and the Maluccio and 
Flores (2004) total estimates suggests that the income effects are on the order of 2.5 to 5.5 
absolute percentage points, or about 25-33% of the non-income effects. 
  Another way to estimate income effects is to utilize the coefficient estimate on the 
variable of the natural log of total household consumption lnConsumption.  In 2001 the 






0.24 in 2002. With a coefficient estimate of .09 on total household consumption, these 
differences would suggest that a transfer the size of RPS would increase schooling on the order 
of two or three percentage points.
8  This magnitude is less than but consistent in magnitude with 
the difference between our estimated non-income effects and the Maluccio and Flores (2004) 
total effects.     
We now examine the combined impacts of power and RPS on school enrollment through 
the interaction of the non-income treatment impact measure (Treat) and the power ratio (rFPSY). 
This interaction term and its square are not statistically significant, which suggests that the 
impacts of RPS treatment do not vary depending on the power of the female head of household. 
In the model with both boys and girls, the linear interaction term is negative and close to 
significant at the 10% level (p = .107), but this result may stem from preexisting differences in 
enrollment by the power measure, that diminish the potential for impact. 
We now turn to the estimation of the impacts of power, RPS, and income on three types 
of expenditures (education, food, and milk). These results are presented in Table 4. Consistent 
with the enrollment results, we find the female power as measured by rFPSY for most 
households has a positive relationship with spending on education, with a negative quadratic 
effect. Similar to the enrollment results, the inflection point of more powerful women occurs at a 
rFPSY of about four (about 4% of the sample). Unlike education, spending on food or milk in 
particular do not show statistically significant relationships with power. 
An examination of the non-income impacts of RPS as measured by the variable Treat 
shows significant positive impacts on spending for milk and food, but not education. The non-






expenditures per capita was $C 73, which is more than double the average baseline consumption. 
Although not as dramatic, the estimated impact of RPS on food consumption per capita of $C 
437 that is nearly 15% increase of baseline consumption. For all three types of expenditures 
(food, schooling and milk) in terms of both total spending, the sign of the coefficient on 
lnConsumption is positive and significant for all three variables, suggesting that as households’ 
total consumption levels increase so does spending on these items.   
Finally, we examine the interactive effects of female power and RPS on the three types of 
expenditures. For both education and food the interactions of power and RPS in per capita 
expenditures does not show a statistically significant coefficient. In terms of milk expenditures 
the effects are at first negative but then turn positive, with non-linear effects working but in the 
opposite fashion as above.  The inflection point is at 2.8 rFPSY; once women’s power surpasses 
that point, more women’s power actually increases impacts.   
In our empirical analysis of RPS, we have examined three main areas. First, we found 
that generally ex ante more female power leads to higher school enrollment and greater spending 
on education. However, consistent with an emerging literature, we found that for households 
with extremely powerful women more female power can begin to reduce schooling. Second, we 
found non-income effects of RPS to be extremely important in terms of school enrollment, which 
is not surprising given the conditionality of the program. In addition, we found non-income 
effects on spending on both food and milk per capita. Although the RPS program encourages 
spending on these items, it was not required, which suggests that other non-income effects 
besides conditionality had an impact. Two likely possibilities are the targeting to women or the 






the impact of RPS. We do not find evidence of decreased impact of RPS when women are less 
powerful. In fact in terms of spending on milk we find households with less powerful females 
see greater impacts, with the exception of when women are extremely powerful. Overall, these 
results support the hypothesis that the goals of schooling and nutrition can be improved by 
directing funds to women and requiring conditionality of school enrollment. 
V. Conclusions 
  A large literature on intra-household bargaining suggests a positive relationship between 
women’s power and the amount of resources devoted to children. In this paper we utilize a 
power measure based on the ratio of male and female head years of schooling to study the 
impacts of a conditional cash transfer program (RPS) in Nicaragua. This measure is generally 
consistent with the excepted positive relationship between women’s power and child schooling. 
However, as suggested by Basu’s (2006) model, we also find that in some cases very high levels 
of women’s power can begin to have negative effects on schooling.  
By targeting transfers to women, RPS and other conditional cash transfer programs have 
the goal of increasing their potential to spend money on children’s schooling and other goods 
such as food, which can improve their human capital. To test RPS’ impact on women and 
children, this paper estimated its effects on two key household decisions: child schooling and 
household expenditures on food and education. The results of these estimations provide 
supporting evidence of the effectiveness of RPS transfers in improving the allocation of 
household resources toward women and children. It appears likely that these effects are driven 






that the non-income effects of the program were responsible for the majority of the nearly 20% 
increases  in  school  enrollment.        
When we separate the enrollment regressions by gender of the child, we find that the 
mother’s education ex-ante of the program always had a positive impact boys education. 
However, the results for girls are consistent with the non-linearity suggested by Basu (2006), in 
that when female power passes a certain threshold female power and schooling begin to have a 
negative relationship. Basu hypothesizes that parental power may influence the percentage of 
benefits from child labor garnered by each adult. This percentage may also depend on the child’s 
gender. The non-monotonic relationship for girls but not boys suggests that when girls leave 
school that the percentage of the benefits received by the female head of household are larger in 
proportion to boys. This result is not surprising as these girls are likely to help out in the home 
relieving female heads of work. 
The expenditure data further supports the effectiveness of targeting transfers to women, 
as RPS’ non-income effects accounted for a more than doubling of milk expenditures and 15% 
increase in food expenditures.  These results suggest that targeting transfers to women has been 
effective at increasing key welfare outcomes for all households, even those with more male 
power. But, these estimates are inferences from econometric analyses and not direct measures of 
treatment effects of targeting transfers to women from a randomized experiment.  If one goal of 
conditional cash transfer programs is to strengthen and broaden the quality of information  






households allocate their resources, or possibly experiments which provide targeted and non-




























Total 23147  23623  -0.7  5850*  4280*  Total Household 
Consumption  Neither   22531  20713  1.9*  6844*  4554* 
 Female  Only  20141  24075  -2.7*  -2348  1139 
 Male  Only  21955  24524  -1.4  5960*  2358* 
 Both  29113  26340  1.8  8521*  6792* 
            
Total 77%  77%  0.04  17%*  11%*  School Enrollment 
Ages 7-13  Neither   73%  71%  0.9  22%*  13%* 
 Female  Only  82%  86%  -0.8  15%*  3% 
 Male  Only  72%  75%  -0.5  18%*  20%* 
 Both  87%  85%  0.5  8%*  6% 
# T-statistics is a comparison of baseline control and treatment 
## Difference-in-Difference is (Treatment2001 – Control2001) – (Treatment2000 –   Control2000) 
## Difference-in-Difference is (Treatment2002 – Control2002) – (Treatment2000 –   Control2000) 
* significant difference at 5% level 
 
 












Total 2801  2969  -1.2  618*  514*  Per Capita Food 
Expenditures  Neither   2602  2506  0.6  776*  410 
 Female  Only  2891  2610  0.7  446  765* 
 Male  Only  2830  2355  1.7  715  558 
 Both  3011  3070  -0.3  966*  591* 
            
Total 49  50  -0.2  48*  42*  Per Capita Milk 
Expenditures  Neither   26  31  -0.5  41*  45* 
 Female  Only  89  89  0.6  88*  -5 
 Male  Only  68  50  0.1  97*  22* 
 Both  59  63    3  68* 
            
Per Capita School 
Expenditures Total  56  65  0.7 2  43 
 Neither    38  26 1.5  24  38* 
 Female  Only  55  36  1.5  22  38 
 Male  Only  41  51  1  30  64* 
 Both  89  89  0.06  -20  54 
# T-statistics is a comparison of baseline control and treatment 
## Difference-in-Difference is (Treatment2001 – Control2001) – (Treatment2000 –   Control2000) 
## Difference-in-Difference is (Treatment2002 – Control2002) – (Treatment2000 –   Control2000) 


















Table 3: Regression on School Enrollment: Impacts of Power and RPS 
 All  Children  Boys  Girls 
Definition Coef.  (SE)  Coef.  (SE)  Coef.  (SE) 
RPS (1) if treatment group  -0.008  0.017  0.034  0.025  -0.054 0.024 
(1) if year 2001  0.062 0.017 0.074  0.024  0.046  0.023 
(1) if year 2002  0.076 0.017 0.092  0.024  0.055  0.023 
Relative Female Power by Schooling Years (rFPSY)  0.040 0.013 0.037  0.020  0.040  0.017 
rFPSY^2  -0.004 0.002 -0.002 0.003  -0.006 0.003 
(1) if RPS group and treatment year (Treat)  0.155 0.030 0.141  0.045  0.173  0.041 
Treat*rFPSY -0.041  0.026  -0.050  0.041  -0.032  0.033 
Treat*rFPSY^2 0.005  0.005  0.005  0.008  0.006  0.006 
Ln(household consumption)  0.094 0.010 0.094  0.014  0.094  0.013 
Ln(household size)  -0.039  0.016  -0.045 0.022  -0.033 0.022 
Constant Term  -0.115 0.095 -0.148  0.140  -0.078  0.129  
-
0.106
  R-Squared = .09  R-Squared = .10  R-Squared = .09 
  N =4593  N = 2337  N = 2256 
Bold figures are significant at the 5% level 
 
 
Table 4: Regression on Per Capita Expenditures by Category: Impacts of Power and RPS 
  Food Per Capita  Education Per Capita  Milk Per Capita 
Definition Coef.  (SE)  Coef.  (SE)  Coef.  (SE) 
RPS (1) if treatment group  55.4  106.1  1.3  12.0  1.5 9.4 
(1) if year 2001  -369.7 99.5  33.3  11.2  20.3 9.2 
(1) if year 2002  -424.3 97.1  55.7  11.0  3.7 9.2 
Relative Female Power by Schooling Years 
(rFPSY) -44.0  81.6  19.9 9.2  1.7 7.7 
rFPSY^2 5.4  12.8  -2.7 1.4  0.8 1.3 
(1) if RPS group and treatment year (Treat)  437.9 176.1 -0.8 19.9 72.9 16.7 
Treat*rFPSY -232.2  144.7  -0.4  16.4  -45.1 14.1 
Treat*rFPSY^2 23.3  24.5  0.3  2.8  8.0 2.5 
Ln(household consumption)  1919.1 51.6 119.4  5.8  27.1 4.7 
Constant Term  -15814.2 511.5 -1122.2  57.8  -217.8 46.8 
  R-Squared = .37  R-Squared = .16  R-Squared = .03 
  N =2550  N =2550  N =2550 
Bold figures are significant at the 5% level 
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1 Unfortunately we are unable to provide a comparison to their study as wage data are not available in the RPS 
sample. 
 
2 Additionally, we do not have individual or community wage data for the RPS sample.  
 
3 An argument could be made to estimate the impact of RPS in each of the two treatment years separately. We find  
 
similar impacts in 2001 and 2002. For ease of interpretation we combine both years into a single measure of the  
 
impact of the treatment in a treatment year since, the results do not change substantially by combining both years of  
 
data into one measure.  
 
4 See Maluccio and Flores (2004) for further information on the program design. Additionally, Maluccio and Flores 
(2004) show that sample attrition rates were similar in both control and treatment communities. 
5 95% of households were eligible to participate (see Maluccio and Flores, 2004). Program participation does not 






                                                                                                                                                             
 
6 (C$) is September 2000, Nicaraguan códdobas, $1 U.S. is about C$12.85   
7 A previous version of the paper used relative literacy in place of the rFPSY measure for power. The key 
relationships are not impacted by the choice of the power measure. The results are available upon request.  
 
8 One concern is that with treatment the impact of total consumption on schooling may vary compared with ex-ante 
consumption patterns. Models that separately estimate the impact of consumption on schooling for only the control 
group yield coefficients not substantially different from the model presented above.  These results are available upon 
request from the authors. 